ISLE OF ANGLESEY COUNTY COUNCIL	
REPORT TO:	**AUDIT COMMITTEE**
DATE:	**13 FEBRUARY 2018**
SUBJECT:	**TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT 2018/19**
LEAD OFFICER:	**MARC JONES**
CONTACT OFFICER:	**GARETH ROBERTS (TEL: EXT 2675)** **CLAIRE KLIMASZEWSKI (TEL : EXT 1865)**
Nature and reason for reporting For scrutiny - consistent with professional guidance.	

1. This report is presented to ensure that the Council is implementing best practice in accordance with the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) Code of Practice for Treasury Management. The code recommends that prior to being presented for adoption, members should scrutinise the Treasury Management Strategy Statement (which includes the Annual Investment Strategy, the annual MRP Policy Statement, the annual Treasury Management Policy Statement and the Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation). This Authority's scheme of delegation charges the Audit Committee with this function.

2. The CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management (Section 7) recommends that the Authority's Treasury Management Practices (TMPs) should be approved, documented and monitored. It goes on to state that the nature and extent of the involvement of an organisation's responsible body in approving and monitoring its TMPs and accompanying schedules is a matter for local decision and recognises that in some organisations this may be delegated to the responsible officer. In all cases it should be subjected to scrutiny by the responsible body following recommendations by the responsible officer. This Authority has produced documented TMPs, and were approved by the Audit Committee on 6 December 2016. There is one proposed change to these TMP's, which needs to be approved by this Committee. The change is to increase the minimum cash balance from £6m to £6.5m in accordance with the latest approved reserve policy.

3. In terms of updates to the Treasury Management Strategy Statement the only proposed amendment to the core principals and policies of the 2017/18 Statement is to amend the Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) Policy. The Authority's External Treasury Management Advisers (Link which was previously known as Capita Asset Management Services) completed a review of the Council's MRP policy. The principles highlighted in their report are included in the revised policy. The policy will lead to a consistent approach to MRP charges between supported and unsupported borrowing. The current policy charges MRP at 4% of the Capital Financing requirement for projects financed by supported borrowing. The MRP charge on assets funded by unsupported borrowing is based on the useful economic lives of those assets. The asset life approach is the one of two approaches permitted for projects funded by unsupported borrowing. The method for charging 4% of the CFR used for supported borrowing is not an option for unsupported borrowing. The asset life approach is a prudent method as it matches the MRP charged against revenue with the expected life of the asset. Therefore, it is recommended that the MRP policy is revised so that the MRP charge, going forward for both supported borrowing and unsupported borrowing will be based on the Asset Life basis. The proposals will lead to lower MRP charges over the next 10 to 15 years, but will then be higher until year 50. The revised policy will be applied back to 2008 to ensure the most prudent charge and consistency between the MRP charge for expenditure funded by supported borrowing and unsupported borrowing. The revised policy can be seen in Appendix 2. This will be subject to consultation and approval of External Audit.

4. The Council's external borrowing stood at £111.4m as at 7 November 2017, and is expected to be £118.0m at 31 March 2018. The borrowing is made up of maturity fixed loans and annuity fixed rate loans. At 7 November 2017, the maturity fixed loans stood at £111.2m with an average life of 23 years, and average interest rate of 5.15%. The annuity fixed rate loans stood at £0.2m with an average life of 8 years and an average interest rate of 9.44%. The anticipated cost of borrowing, which is the interest payable on existing loans, for 2017/18, is £5.9m for both the General Fund (£3.9m) and HRA (£2.0m).There will also be a Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) charge, which is the revenue charge to pay off an element of the accumulated capital spend each year (Appendix 2). In 2017/18 this charge will be £4.7m for both the General Fund (£3.8m) and HRA (£0.9m). This means that the Capital Finance Requirement (the forecast underlying need to borrow to finance the capital programme) at the year end will be £138.1m, resulting in the Council being internally borrowed (see section 3.3.1) by £20.1m by the year end.

The Council's investments as at 7 November 2017 stood at £13.4m with an average rate of return of 0.15% and the average balance for the year to date is £16.6m. As internal borrowing has increased the investment balances have decreased.

5. Recommendations:

- To note the contents of this covering report;
- To endorse the Treasury Management Strategy Statement (including the Prudential and Treasury Management Indicators) [Annex A] for 2018/19; and
- To pass any recommendations and/or comments to the Executive Committee.
- To approve the change in TMP's, increasing the minimum cash balance from £6m to £6.5m, to reflect the increase in the minimum general reserve balance.

ANNEX A

TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT

ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY, MINIMUM REVENUE PROVISION POLICY STATEMENT AND TREASURY MANAGEMENT POLICY STATEMENT 2018/19

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, meaning that total income due during the financial year must be sufficient to meet expenditure, and also that actual cash inflows must be adequate to cover cash outflows. A key part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's policy to minimise risk ensuring adequate liquidity before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

A particular point is that a local authority must calculate its budget requirement for each financial year to include the revenue costs that flow from capital financing decisions. This means that:-

- increases in revenue costs resulting from increases in interest charges, incurred to finance additional borrowing to finance capital expenditure; and
- any increases in running costs from new capital projects, must be limited to a level which is affordable within the Council's projected income.

The Treasury Management Policy Statement defines the policies and objectives of the treasury management activities. See Appendix 10.

1.2 Reporting Requirements

The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of polices, estimates and actuals. These reports are required to be adequately scrutinised by committee before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Audit Committee.

Prudential and Treasury Management Indicators and Treasury Strategy - The first and most important report, covers:-

- the Treasury Management Strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury management indicators;
- an Investment Strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed);
- a Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) Policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- a Treasury Management Policy Statement (definition of the policies and objectives of the treasury management function); and
- the capital plans (including the associated prudential indicators).

A Mid-Year Treasury Management Report - This will update members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether the treasury strategy is meeting its objectives or whether any policies require revision.

An Annual Treasury Report - This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury management indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2018/19

The strategy for 2018/19 covers two main areas:-

Capital Issues

- The capital plans and the prudential indicators; and
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) strategy.

Treasury management Issues

- The current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which will limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, the Welsh Government MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and the Welsh Government Investment Guidance.

1.4 Training

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that Members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to Members responsible for scrutiny. In order to support the scrutiny role of the members of the Audit Committee, the committee's members received training in treasury management, delivered by the appointed treasury management consultants on November 9 2016. Further training will be arranged when required.

The training needs of treasury management officers are regularly reviewed and addressed.

1.5 Treasury management consultants

The Council uses The Link Group as its external treasury management advisors. In accordance with procurement regulations the Treasury Management advisory service were advertised for tender for the period 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2019 with an option to extend for 2 years. Capita Asset Services being the succesful tender.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

Capita Asset Service has been sold to The Link Group, however, the services provided will not change under the new ownership.

1.6 Adoption of the Code

The Council is required to indicate if it has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management. The current, 2011, code of practice has already been adopted by this Council therefore no update is required for 2018/19. In addition the authority follows guidance in the CIPFA Prudential Code 2013 which supplements the CIPFA code of practice on Treasury Management. However, the Prudential code and Treasury Management code have been reviewed and were published in January 2018. The code considers 2018/19 to being a transition year, with full implementation from 2019/20.

2. Capital Considerations

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts.

The Authority's capital expenditure projections for 2017/18 to 2020/21 are reflected in the Prudential Indicators (Appendix 11). The projected expenditure for 2018/19 to 2020/21 is based on the capital strategy that was approved by The Executive at its' meeting on 30 October 2017, and the draft proposal for Band B of the 21st Century Schools Programme. The projections for those years also includes the assumption that slippage from 2017/18 will be fully spent in 2018/19.

The overall programmes will be limited to what is affordable, both in terms of actual capital spend and in terms of the revenue implications (see 1.1 above). The prudential indicators are contained in Appendix 11. The table below summarises the capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need, which can be seen in table 3.1.

Capital expenditure £'000m	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Non-HRA	28,030	22,030	38,800	34,340	16,060
HRA	8,610	11,490	13,820	15,200	15,340
Total	**36,640**	**33,520**	**52,620**	**49,540**	**31,400**
Financed by:					
Capital receipts	5,240	3,100	1,260	500	500
Capital grants	14,800	11,360	30,800	25,230	8,940
Reserves	580	510	300	0	0
Revenue	5,050	8,830	11,160	9,040	9,380
Loan	150	1,000	0	0	0
Net financing need for the year	**10,820**	**8,720**	**9,100**	**14,770**	**12,580**

3. Borrowing

The capital expenditure plans, set out in section 2 (above) of this report, provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity and the Council's capital strategy. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury/prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

3.1 Current and Projected Borrowing Requirement and Actual Borrowing

The forecast movements in the Council's capital financing requirement (CFR) are:-

ESTIMATED MOVEMENTS IN THE CAPITAL FINANCING REQUIREMENT AND REPLACEMENT BORROWING 2017/18 TO 2020/21				
	2017/18 Projected £'000	**2018/19 Estimate £'000**	**2019/20 Estimate £'000**	**2020/21 Estimate £'000**
Movement in the CFR				
New borrowing to support capital expenditure				
Supported Borrowing	*2,131*	*4,422*	*4,370*	*3,959*
Unsupported Borrowing	*6,583*	*4,679*	*10,404*	*8,620*
Total	**8,714**	**9,101**	**14,774**	**12,579**
Reduce by: Minimum Revenue Provision and set aside capital receipts	(4,667)	(3,223)	(3,328)	(3,584)
Net movement in the CFR	**4,047**	**5,878**	**11,446**	**8,995**
Potential movements in actual borrowing				
Movement in the CFR (above)	-	**5,878**	**11,446**	**8,995**
Externalisation of pre 2017/18 internal borrowing	-	20,100	**-**	**-**
Replacement Borrowing (included in unsupported borrowing above)	**-**	5,000	5,000	4,500
Total potential new borrowing	**-**	**30,978**	**16,446**	**13,495**

3.2 Prospects for Interest Rates

The Council's appointed treasury advisor is Capita Asset Services and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Appendix 3 draws together a number of current City forecasts for short term (Bank Rate) and longer fixed interest rates. The following table gives the Capita central view.

Annual Average (%)	Bank Rate (%)	PWLB Borrowing Rates (including certainty rate adjustment)		
		5 year	25 year	50 year
December 2017	0.50	1.50	2.80	2.50
March 2018	0.50	1.60	2.90	2.60
June 2018	0.50	1.60	3.00	2.70
September 2018	0.50	1.70	3.00	2.80
December 2018	0.75	1.80	3.10	2.90
March 2019	0.75	1.80	3.10	2.90
June 2019	0.75	1.90	3.20	3.00
September 2019	0.75	1.90	3.20	3.00
December 2019	1.00	2.00	3.30	3.10
March 2020	1.00	2.10	3.40	3.20
June 2020	1.00	2.10	3.50	3.30
September 2020	1.25	2.20	3.50	3.30
December 2020	1.25	2.30	3.60	3.40
March 2021	1.25	2.30	3.60	3.40

As expected, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate at its meeting on 2 November. This removed the emergency cut in August 2016 after the EU referendum. The MPC also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank rate only twice more by 0.25% by 2020 to end at 1.00%. The Link Asset Services forecast as above includes increases in Bank Rate of 0.25% in November 2018, November 2019 and August 2020.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. It has long been expected, that at some point, there would be a more protracted move from bonds to equities after a historic long-term trend, over about the last 25 years, of falling bond yields. The action of central banks since the financial crash of 2008, in implementing substantial Quantitative Easing, added further impetus to this downward trend in bond yields and rising bond prices. Quantitative Easing has also directly led to a rise in equity values as investors searched for higher returns and took on riskier assets. The sharp rise in bond yields since the US Presidential election in November 2016 has called into question whether the previous trend may go into reverse, especially now the Fed has taken the lead in reversing monetary policy by starting, in October 2017, a policy of not fully reinvesting proceeds from bonds that it holds when they mature.

Until 2015, monetary policy was focused on providing stimulus to economic growth but has since started to refocus on countering the threat of rising inflationary pressures as stronger economic growth becomes more firmly established. The Fed. has started raising interest rates and this trend is expected to continue during 2018 and 2019. These increases will make holding US bonds much less attractive and cause their prices to fall, and therefore bond yields to rise. Rising bond yields in the US are likely to exert some upward pressure on bond yields in the UK and other developed economies. However, the degree of that upward pressure is likely to be dampened by how strong or weak the prospects for economic growth and rising inflation are in each country, and on the degree of progress towards the reversal of monetary policy away from quantitative easing and other credit stimulus measures.

From time to time, gilt yields – and therefore PWLB rates - can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis and emerging market developments. Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

Economic and interest rate forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. The above forecasts (and MPC decisions) will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Geopolitical developments, especially in the EU, could also have a major impact. Forecasts for average investment earnings beyond the three-year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is probably to the downside, particularly with the current level of uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- Bank of England monetary policy takes action too quickly to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Geopolitical risks, especially North Korea., but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, possibly Italy, due to its high level of government debt, low rate of economic growth and vulnerable banking system.
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks.
- The result of the October 2017 Austrian general election is likely to result in a strongly anti-immigrant coalition government. This could provide major impetus to other, particularly former Communist bloc countries, to coalesce to create a major block to progress on EU integration and centralisation of EU policy. This, in turn, could spill over into impacting the Euro, EU financial policy and financial markets.
- Rising protectionism under President Trump
- A sharp Chinese downturn and its impact on emerging market countries

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- The Bank of England is too slow in its initial pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflation pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- UK inflation returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.
- The Fed causing a sudden shock in financial markets through misjudging the pace and strength of increases in the Fed. Funds Rate and in the pace and strength of reversal of Quantitative Easing, which then leads to a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds, as opposed to equities. This could lead to a major flight from bonds to equities and a sharp increase in bond yields in the US, which could then spill over into impacting bond yields around the world.

Investment and borrowing rates

- Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2018/19 but to be on a gently rising trend over the next few years.

- Borrowing interest rates increased sharply after the result of the general election in June and then also after the September MPC meeting when financial markets reacted by accelerating their expectations for the timing of Bank Rate increases. Apart from that, there has been little general trend in rates during the current financial year. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in the future when authorities may not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance capital expenditure and/or the refinancing of maturing debt;

- There will remain a cost of carry to any new long-term borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost – the difference between borrowing costs and investment returns.

3.3 Borrowing Strategy

The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This approach is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue that needs to be considered (see 3.3.1 below for a more detailed consideration of internal and external borrowing). As part of this strategy the ability to externally borrow to repay the reserves and balances if needed is important. Table 3.1 indicates that £20.100m may need to be externally borrowed if urgently required. This is the amount of council reserves and balances used in the past to fund the capital programme instead of taking out borrowing.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2018/19 treasury operations. The S151 Officer will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:-

- if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered if it is cost effective to do so.

- If it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the start date and in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years

  Any decisions will be reported to this committee at the next available opportunity.

3.3.1 External v. internal borrowing

Current conditions indicate a need for a flexible approach to the choice between internal and external borrowing. Many of the factors which lay behind previous policies to externalise all borrowing remain valid, e.g.:-

- With a continuing historically abnormally low Bank Rate and PWLB rates, there remains a unique opportunity for local authorities to actively manage their strategy of undertaking new external borrowing.

However, it remains the case that there are certain limitations to this approach, as previously noted, e.g.:-

- The policy can cause exposure to credit risk (e.g. risk of the bank defaulting on the debt), so this aspect must be very carefully managed;
- Careful on going consideration needs to be given to the difference between borrowing rates and investment rates to ensure the Council obtains value for money once an appropriate level of risk management has been attained to ensure the security of its investments.

In favour of internalisation, over the medium term investment rates are expected to continue to be below long term borrowing rates. This means that value for money considerations would indicate that value could best be obtained by avoiding new external borrowing and by using internal cash balances to finance new capital expenditure, or to replace maturing external debt (this is referred to as internal borrowing). This would maximise short term savings.

However, short term savings by avoiding new long term external borrowing in 2017/18 must also be weighed against the potential for incurring additional long term extra costs, by delaying unavoidable new external borrowing until later years when PWLB long term rates are forecast to be higher. Additionally, the cash flow implications of internalising borrowing require regular review and will limit the potential extent of internalising borrowing.

Against this background, caution will be adopted with the 2018/19 treasury operations. The S151 Officer will monitor the interest rate market and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances, reporting any decisions to the appropriate decision making body at the earliest opportunity.

3.4 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

The Council will not borrow more than, or in advance of, its needs, solely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

In determining whether borrowing will be undertaken in advance of need the Council will:-

- ensure that there is a clear link between the capital programme and maturity profile of the existing debt portfolio which supports the need to take funding in advance of need;
- ensure the ongoing revenue liabilities created, and the implications for the future plans and budgets, have been considered;
- evaluate the economic and market factors that might influence the manner and timing of any decision to borrow;
- consider the advantages and disadvantages of alternative forms of funding;
- consider the alternative interest rate bases available, the most appropriate periods to fund and repayment profiles to use; and
- consider the impact of borrowing in advance on temporarily (until required to finance capital expenditure) increasing investment cash balances and the consequent increase in exposure to counterparty risk, and other risks, and the level of such risks given the controls in place to minimise them.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

3.5 Debt Rescheduling

As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term fixed interest rates, there may be potential opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the current treasury position and the size of the cost of debt repayment (i.e. premiums incurred).

The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:-

- the generation of cash savings and/or discounted cash flow savings;
- helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;
- enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.

All rescheduling will be reported to the Audit Committee, at the earliest practicable meeting following its action.

4. Annual Investment Strategy

4.1 Investment Policy

The Council's investment policy has regard to the Welsh Government's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance") and the revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross-Sectorial Guidance Notes ("the CIPFA TM Code"). The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, and then return.

In accordance with the above guidance from the Welsh Government and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

As with previous practice, ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution and that it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "credit default swaps" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in Appendix 5 under the 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council's treasury management practices – schedules.

The Council will also from time to time, make loans, deposits and investments 'for the purpose of delivery of its Service's (policy investments). These transactions will require the authority of the County Council for amounts over £100k. All transactions will be subject to adequate credit quality and the approval of the Section 151 Officer in consultation with the Portfolio Holder for Finance.

4.2 Creditworthiness policy

The primary principle governing the Council's investment criteria is the security of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After this main principle, the Council will ensure that:-

- It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the specified and non-specified investment sections below; and

- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council's prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

The S151 Officer will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the criteria set out in Appendix 6 and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary. These criteria are separate to that which determines which types of investment instrument are either specified or non-specified as it provides an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality which the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.

Credit rating information is supplied by Capita Asset Services, our treasury consultants, on all active counterparties that comply with the criteria below. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria would be omitted from the counterparty (dealing) list. Any rating changes, rating Watches (notification of a likely change), rating Outlooks (notification of the longer term bias outside the central rating view) are provided to officers almost immediately after they occur and this information is considered before dealing. For instance, a negative rating Watch applying to a counterparty at the minimum Council criteria will be suspended from use, with all others being reviewed in light of market conditions.

All credit ratings will be monitored daily. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Capita creditworthiness service.

As an additional layer to the minimum credit rating criteria described above, this Council also employs the creditworthiness service provided by Capita Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:-

- Credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- Sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads from which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council at the discretion of the S151 Officer, to assist in determining the duration for investments. The Council will, therefore, normally use counterparties within the following durational bands:-

- Yellow 5 years *
- Dark pink 5 years for Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit score of 1.25
- Light pink 5 years for Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit score of 1.5
- Purple 2 years
- Blue 1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks)
- Orange 1 year
- Red 6 months
- Green 100 days
- No colour not to be used

The Capita Asset Services creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings and, by using a risk weighted scoring system, does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.

Reference will also be made to other market data and market information, as available and as appropriate.

4.3 Country limits

The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch Ratings (or equivalent from other agencies if Fitch does not provide). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 7. This list will be added to or deducted from by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

4.4 Investment Strategy

In-house funds***:***. Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

Investment returns expectations: Bank Rate is forecast to stay flat at 0.50% until quarter 4 2018 and not to rise above 1.25% by quarter 1 2021. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2017/18 0.50%
- 2018/19 0.75%
- 2019/20 1.00%
- 2020/21 1.25%

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows:-

2017/18 0.40%
2018/19 0.60%
2019/20 0.90%
2020/21 1.25%
2021/22 1.50%
2022/23 1.75%
2023/24 2.00%
Later years 2.75%

The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently skewed to the upside and are dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how quickly inflation pressures rise and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its business reserve instant access and notice accounts and short-dated deposits (overnight to 100 days) in order to benefit from the compounding of interest.

4.5 End of Year Investment Report

At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

4.6 External Fund Managers

The Council has not appointed external fund managers. The need for this will be kept under review and a reported as appropriate before such an appointment is made.

4.7 Policy on the use of External Service Providers

In order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources, the Council uses Capita Assets Services as its external treasury management advisors. The terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

Final responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the Council.

4.8 Delegation

The Treasury Management scheme of delegation and the role of the Section 151 Officer are outlined in Appendix 8.

APPENDICES

1. Loan maturity profile
2. MRP Policy Statement
3. Interest rate forecasts
4. Economic background
5. Specified and non-specified investments
6. Counterparty criteria
7. Approved countries for investments
8. Treasury management scheme of delegation and the role of the section 151 officer.
9. Treasury Management Key Principles
10. Treasury Management Policy Statement
11. Prudential and Treasury Indicators
12. Glossary of and information on Prudential & Treasury Management indicators

DADANSODDIAD BENTHYCIADAU YN AEDDFEDU 2017/18 YMLAEN GAN PWLB / PWLB LOANS MATURITY ANALYSIS 2017/18 ONWARDS						
	PWLB Aeddefedu/ PWLB Maturity £'000	**PWLB EIP/ Annuity/ PWLB EIP/ Annuity £'000**	**Benthyciadau Marchnad/ Market Loans £'000**	**PWLB Amrywiol/ PWLB Variable £'000**	**Cyfanswm yn Aeddfedu/ Total Maturing £'000**	**%Yn Aeddfedu o'r Cyfran yn sefyll/ Maturing of Total Outstanding %**
2017/18	0	5	0	0	0	0.0
2018/19	5,000	10	0	0	5,010	4.5
2019/20	5,000	11	0	0	5,011	4.5
2020/21	4,500	12	0	0	4,512	4.0
2021/22	0	14	0	0	14	0.0
2022/23	2,285	15	0	0	2,300	1.7
2023/24	1,854	16	0	0	1,870	2.1
2024/25	0	18	0	0	18	0.0
2025/26	0	20	0	0	20	0.0
2026/27	1,381	22	0	0	1,403	1.3
2027/28	2,165	24	0	0	2,189	2.0
2028/29	262	26	0	0	288	0.3
2029/30	1,539	21	0	0	1,560	1.4
2030/31	451	15	0	0	466	0.4
2031/32	1,941	9	0	0	1,950	1.7
2032/33	315	8	0	0	323	0.3
2033/34	637	0	0	0	637	0.6
2034/35	624	0	0	0	624	0.6
2035/36	611	0	0	0	611	0.5
2036/37	599	0	0	0	599	0.5
2037/38	587	0	0	0	587	0.5
2038/39	225	0	0	0	225	0.2
2039/40	5,000	0	0	0	5,000	4.5
2040/41	3,500	0	0	0	3,500	3.1
2042/43	1,000	0	0	0	1,000	0.9
2043/44	1,020	0	0	0	1,020	0.9
2044/45	1,010	0	0	0	1,010	0.9
2045/46	11,464	0	0	0	11,464	10.3
2050/51	2,000	0	0	0	2,000	1.8
2052/53	28,238	0	0	0	28,238	25.3
2054/55	3,000	0	0	0	3,000	2.7
2055/56	3,500	0	0	0	3,500	3.2
2056/57	5,000	0	0	0	5,000	4.5
2057/58	8,513	0	0	0	8,513	7.6
2059/60	1,763	0	0	0	1,763	1.6
2066/67	6,200	0	0	0	6,200	5.6
	111,184	**246**	**0**	**0**	**111,430**	**100.0**
Cyfartaledd bywyd (blynyddoedd)/ Average life(years)	23.12	8.13	0.00	0.00	23.09	
Cyfartaledd graddfa (%)/ Average rate (%)	5.26	9.41	0.00	0.00	5.15	

PROFFIL AD-DALU BENTHYCIADAU ERAILL 2017/18 YMLAEN / OTHER LOANS REPAYMENT PROFILE 2017/18 ONWARDS						
	Llywodraeth Cymru / Welsh Government £'000	Benthycaf Salix Loan 1 £'000	Benthycaf Salix Loan 2 £'000	Benthycaf Salix Loan 3 £'000	Cyfanswm / Total £'000	
2017/18	40	8	0	0	48	
2018/19	40	16	46	0	102	
2019/20	40	16	46	80	182	
2020/21	40	16	46	80	182	
2021/22	0	16	46	80	142	
2022/23	0	16	46	80	142	
2023/24	0	16	45	79	140	
2024/25	0	8	45	79	132	
2025/26	0	0	45	79	124	
2026/27	0	0	0	79	79	

Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement 2018/19

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated Council Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision, MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision, VRP).

The Welsh Government regulations require the full Council to approve an MRP Statement in advance of each year. A variety of options is provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:-

For capital expenditure incurred between 1 April 2008 and 31 March 2018, financed by supported borrowing, the MRP policy will be to charge MRP on the Equal Instalment method, Asset Life basis over 50 years. The MRP on capital expenditure funded by unsupported borrowing during this period has already been charged using the Equal Instalment method, Asset Life basis using the estimated lives of the assets, based on information available at that time. This change in policy realigns the MRP policies for assets funded by supported borrowing and assets funded by unsupported borrowing.

From 1st April 2018 for all supported and unsupported borrowing (including PFI and finance leases), the MRP policy will also be the Equal Instalment Annuity Method, the Asset Life basis. However, the estimated life periods, will be set by the S151 Officer based upon advice received from the relevant officers and will have regard to Welsh Government guidance in relation to MRP and asset lives. Where land is purchased, the asset life will be based on the asset life of the asset placed on the land, which in the majority of cases will be 50 years in line with the asset life for buildings.

MRP charges based on asset life would not be charged until the year the asset becomes operational. The S151 Officer may postpone the MRP charge until the financial year following the one in which the asset becomes operational. The estimated asset life of the asset would be determined in the year the MRP commences and would not change over the life of the asset. The estimated life periods, will be set by the S151 Officer based upon advice received from the relevant officers and will have regard to Statutory requirements and Welsh Government guidance in relation to MRP and asset life. Where land is purchased, the asset life will be based on the asset life of the asset placed on the land, which in the majority of cases will be 50 years in line with the asset life for buildings.

As some types of capital expenditure incurred by the Council are not capable of being related to an individual asset, asset lives will be assessed on a basis, which most reasonably reflects the anticipated period of benefit that arises from the expenditure. In addition, whatever type of expenditure is involved, it will be grouped together in a manner which reflects the nature of the main component of expenditure and will only be divided up in cases where there are two or more major components with substantially different useful economic lives.

The Council retains the right to make additional voluntary payments to reduce debt if deemed prudent.

The Housing Revenue Account share of the CFR is subject to a 2% MRP charge, based upon the closing CFR for the previous year, in line with the approved 30-year business plan.

Any repayments included in annual PFI or finance leases are applied as MRP and will be consistent with the asset life basis over the life of the lease or PFI scheme.

Rhagolygon Graddfeydd Llog 2017/2021
Interest Rate Forecasts 2017/2021

PWLB rates and forecast shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.

Link Asset Services Interest Rate View	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Bank Rate View	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%
3 Month LIBID	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.70%	0.90%	0.90%	1.00%	1.20%	1.20%	1.20%
6 Month LIBID	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.60%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.00%	1.10%	1.30%	1.30%	1.40%
12 Month LIBID	0.70%	0.80%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.00%	1.10%	1.10%	1.30%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.50%	1.60%
5yr PWLB Rate	1.50%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%
10yr PWLB Rate	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%
25yr PWLB Rate	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
50yr PWLB Rate	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%
Bank Rate														
Link Asset Services	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%
Capital Economics	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	-	-	-	-	-
5yr PWLB Rate														
Link Asset Services	1.50%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%
Capital Economics	1.70%	1.90%	2.30%	2.60%	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	-	-	-	-	-
10yr PWLB Rate														
Link Asset Services	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%
Capital Economics	2.30%	2.60%	2.80%	3.10%	3.30%	3.30%	3.30%	3.30%	3.30%	-	-	-	-	-
25yr PWLB Rate														
Link Asset Services	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
Capital Economics	2.95%	3.15%	3.45%	3.65%	3.90%	3.90%	3.90%	3.90%	3.90%	-	-	-	-	-
50yr PWLB Rate														
Link Asset Services	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%
Capital Economics	2.80%	3.10%	3.30%	3.60%	3.80%	3.80%	3.80%	3.80%	3.80%	-	-	-	-	-

Please note – The current PWLB rates and forecast shown above have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012

Rhan o gyngor dderbyniwyd gan / An extract from advice received from: Capita Asset Services

Economic Background

GLOBAL OUTLOOK - World growth looks to be on an encouraging trend of stronger performance, rising earnings and falling levels of unemployment. In October, the IMF upgraded its forecast for world growth from 3.2% to 3.6% for 2017 and 3.7% for 2018.

In addition, **inflation prospects are generally muted** and it is particularly notable that **wage inflation** has been subdued despite unemployment falling to historically very low levels in the UK and US. This has led to many comments by economists that there appears to have been a fundamental shift downwards in the Phillips curve (this plots the correlation between levels of unemployment and inflation e.g. if the former is low the latter tends to be high). In turn, this raises the question of what has caused this? The likely answers probably lay in a combination of a shift towards flexible working, self-employment, falling union membership and a consequent reduction in union power and influence in the economy, and increasing globalisation and specialisation of individual countries, which has meant that labour in one country is in competition with labour in other countries which may be offering lower wage rates, increased productivity or a combination of the two. In addition, technology is probably also exerting downward pressure on wage rates and this is likely to grow with an accelerating movement towards automation, robots and artificial intelligence, leading to many repetitive tasks being taken over by machines or computers. Indeed, this is now being labelled as being the start of the **fourth industrial revolution.**

KEY RISKS - central bank monetary policy measures

Looking back on nearly ten years since the financial crash of 2008 when liquidity suddenly dried up in financial markets, it can be assessed that central banks' monetary policy measures to counter the sharp world recession were successful. The key monetary policy measures they used were a combination of lowering central interest rates and flooding financial markets with liquidity, particularly through unconventional means such as Quantitative Easing (QE), where central banks bought large amounts of central government debt and smaller sums of other debt.

The key issue now is that that period of stimulating economic recovery and warding off the threat of deflation is coming towards its close and a new period has already started in the US, and more recently in the UK, on reversing those measures i.e. by raising central rates and (for the US) reducing central banks' holdings of government and other debt. These measures are now required in order to stop the trend of an on-going reduction in spare capacity in the economy, and of unemployment falling to such low levels that the re-emergence of inflation is viewed as a major risk. It is, therefore, crucial that central banks get their timing right and do not cause shocks to market expectations that could destabilise financial markets. In particular, a key risk is that because QE-driven purchases of bonds drove up the price of government debt, and therefore caused a sharp drop in income yields, this then also encouraged investors into a search for yield and into investing in riskier assets such as equities. This resulted in bond markets and equity market prices both rising to historically high valuation levels simultaneously. This, therefore, makes both asset categories vulnerable to a sharp correction. It is important, therefore, that central banks only gradually unwind their holdings of bonds in order to prevent destabilising the financial markets. It is also likely that the timeframe for central banks unwinding their holdings of QE debt purchases will be over several years. They need to balance their timing to neither squash economic recovery by taking too rapid and too strong action, or, alternatively, let inflation run away by taking action that was too slow and/or too weak. **The potential for central banks to get this timing and strength of action wrong are now key risks.**

There is also a potential key question over whether economic growth has become too dependent on strong central bank stimulus and whether it will maintain its momentum against a backdrop of rising interest rates and the reversal of QE. In the UK, a key vulnerability is the **low level of productivity growth**, which may be the main driver for increases in wages; and **decreasing consumer disposable income,** which is important in the context of consumer expenditure primarily underpinning UK GDP growth.

A further question that has come to the fore is whether **an inflation target for central banks of 2%**, is now realistic given the shift down in inflation pressures from internally generated inflation, (i.e. wage inflation feeding through into the national economy), given the above mentioned shift down in the Phillips curve.

- Some economists favour a shift to a **lower inflation target of 1%** to emphasise the need to keep the lid on inflation. Alternatively, it is possible that a central bank could simply 'look through' tepid wage inflation, (i.e. ignore the overall 2% inflation target), in order to take action in raising rates sooner than might otherwise be expected.
- However, other economists would argue for a **shift *UP* in the inflation target to 3%** in order to ensure that central banks place the emphasis on maintaining economic growth through adopting a slower pace of withdrawal of stimulus.
- In addition, there is a strong argument that central banks should **target financial market stability**. As mentioned previously, bond markets and equity markets could be vulnerable to a sharp correction. There has been much commentary, that since 2008, QE has caused massive distortions, imbalances and bubbles in asset prices, both financial and non-financial. Consequently, there are widespread concerns at the potential for such bubbles to be burst by exuberant central bank action. On the other hand, too slow or weak action would allow these imbalances and distortions to continue or to even inflate them further.
- Consumer debt levels are also at historically high levels due to the prolonged period of low cost of borrowing since the financial crash. In turn, this cheap borrowing has meant that **other non-financial asset prices**, particularly house prices, have been driven up to very high levels, especially compared to income levels. Any sharp downturn in the availability of credit, or increase in the cost of credit, could potentially destabilise the housing market and generate a sharp downturn in house prices. This could then have a destabilising effect on consumer confidence, consumer expenditure and GDP growth. However, no central bank would accept that it ought to have responsibility for specifically targeting house prices.

UNITED KINGDOM - After the UK surprised on the upside with strong economic growth in 2016, **growth in 2017 has been disappointingly weak**; quarter 1 came in at only +0.2% (+2.0% y/y), quarter 2 was +0.3% (+1.7% y/y) and quarter 3 was +0.4% (+1.6% y/y). The main reason for this has been the sharp increase in inflation, caused by the devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum, feeding increases in the cost of imports into the economy. This has caused, in turn, a reduction in consumer disposable income and spending power and so the services sector of the economy, accounting for around 80% of GDP, has seen weak growth as consumers cut back on their expenditure. However, more recently there have been encouraging statistics from the **manufacturing sector** which is seeing strong growth, particularly as a result of increased demand for exports. It has helped that growth in the EU, our main trading partner, has improved significantly over the last year while robust world growth has also been supportive. However, this sector only accounts for around 10% of GDP so expansion in this sector will have a much more muted effect on the overall GDP growth figure for the UK economy as a whole.

While the Bank of England is expected to give forward guidance to prepare financial markets for gradual changes in policy, the **Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), meeting of 14 September 2017** managed to shock financial markets and forecasters by suddenly switching to a much more aggressive tone in terms of its words around warning that Bank Rate will need to rise soon. The Bank of England Inflation Reports during 2017 have clearly flagged up that it expected CPI inflation to peak at just under 3% in 2017, before falling back to near to its target rate of 2% in two years' time. The Bank revised its forecast for the peak to just over 3% at the 14 September meeting MPC. (Inflation actually came in at 3.0% in September and is

expected to rise slightly in the coming months.) This marginal revision in the Bank's forecast can hardly justify why the MPC became so aggressive with its wording; rather, the focus was on an emerging view that with unemployment having already fallen to only 4.3%, the lowest level since 1975, and improvements in productivity being so weak, that **the amount of spare capacity in the economy was significantly diminishing** towards a point at which they now needed to take action. In addition, the MPC took a more tolerant view of low wage inflation as this now looks like a common factor in nearly all western economies as a result of automation and globalisation. However, the Bank was also concerned that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU would effectively lead to a *decrease* in such globalisation pressures in the UK, and so this would cause additional inflationary pressure over the next few years.

At Its 2 November meeting, the MPC duly delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate. It also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank Rate only twice more in the next three years to reach 1.0% by 2020. This is, therefore, not quite the 'one and done' scenario but is, nevertheless, a very relaxed rate of increase prediction in Bank Rate in line with previous statements that Bank Rate would only go up very gradually and to a limited extent.

However, some forecasters are flagging up that they expect growth to accelerate significantly towards the end of 2017 and then into 2018. This view is based primarily on the coming fall in inflation, (as the effect of the effective devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum drops out of the CPI statistics), which will bring to an end the negative impact on consumer spending power. In addition, a strong export performance will compensate for weak services sector growth. If this scenario was indeed to materialise, then the MPC would be likely to accelerate its pace of increases in Bank Rate during 2018 and onwards.

It is also worth noting the **contradiction within the Bank of England** between action in 2016 and in 2017 **by two of its committees**. After the shock result of the EU referendum, the **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)** voted in August 2016 for emergency action to cut Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, restarting £70bn of QE purchases, and also providing UK banks with £100bn of cheap financing. The aim of this was to lower borrowing costs, stimulate demand for borrowing and thereby increase expenditure and demand in the economy. The MPC felt this was necessary in order to ward off their expectation that there would be a sharp slowdown in economic growth. Instead, the economy grew robustly, although the Governor of the Bank of England strongly maintained that this was *because* the MPC took that action. However, other commentators regard this emergency action by the MPC as being proven by events to be a mistake. Then in 2017, we had the **Financial Policy Committee (FPC)** of the Bank of England taking action in June and September over its concerns that cheap borrowing rates, and easy availability of consumer credit, had resulted in too rapid a rate of growth in consumer borrowing and in the size of total borrowing, especially of unsecured borrowing. It, therefore, took punitive action to clamp down on the ability of the main banks to extend such credit! Indeed, a PWC report in October 2017 warned that credit card, car and personal loans and student debt will hit the equivalent of an average of £12,500 per household by 2020. However, averages belie wide variations in levels of debt with much higher exposure being biased towards younger people, especially the 25 -34 year old band, reflecting their lower levels of real income and asset ownership.

One key area of risk is that consumers may have become used to cheap rates since 2008 for borrowing, especially for mortgages. It is a major concern that **some consumers may have over extended their borrowing** and have become complacent about interest rates going up after Bank Rate had been unchanged at 0.50% since March 2009 until falling further to 0.25% in August 2016. This is why forward guidance from the Bank of England continues to emphasise slow and gradual increases in Bank Rate once they start. However, consumer borrowing is a particularly vulnerable area in terms of the Monetary Policy Committee getting the pace and strength of Bank Rate increases right - without causing a sudden shock to consumer demand, confidence and thereby to the pace of economic growth.

Moreover, while there is so much uncertainty around the Brexit negotiations, consumer confidence, and business confidence to spend on investing, it is far too early to be confident about how the next two to three years will actually pan out.

EUROPEAN UNION - Economic growth in the EU, (the UK's biggest trading partner), had been lack lustre for several years after the financial crisis despite the ECB eventually cutting its main rate to -0.4% and embarking on a massive programme of QE. However, growth picked up in 2016 and has now gathered substantial strength and momentum thanks to this stimulus. GDP growth was 0.5% in quarter 1 (2.0% y/y), 0.6% in quarter 2 (2.3% y/y) and +0.6% in quarter 3 (2.5% y/y). However, despite providing massive monetary stimulus, the European Central Bank is still struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target and in October inflation was 1.4%. It is therefore unlikely to start on an upswing in rates until possibly 2019. It has, however, announced that it will slow down its monthly QE purchases of debt from €60bn to €30bn from January 2018 and continue to at least September 2018.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - Growth in the American economy was notably erratic and volatile in 2015 and 2016. 2017 is following that path again with quarter 1 coming in at only 1.2% but quarter 2 rebounding to 3.1% and quarter 3 coming in at 3.0%. Unemployment in the US has also fallen to the lowest level for many years, reaching 4.2%, while wage inflation pressures, and inflationary pressures in general, have been building. The Fed has started on a gradual upswing in rates with four increases in all and three increases since December 2016; and there could be one more rate rise in 2017, which would then lift the central rate to 1.25 – 1.50%. There could then be another four increases in 2018. At its September meeting, the Fed said it would start in October to gradually unwind its $4.5 trillion balance sheet holdings of bonds and mortgage backed securities by reducing its reinvestment of maturing holdings.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.

JAPAN has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

Brexit timetable and process

- March 2017: UK government notifies the European Council of its intention to leave under the Treaty on European Union Article 50
- March 2019: initial two-year negotiation period on the terms of exit. In her Florence speech in September 2017, the Prime Minister proposed a two year transitional period after March 2019.
- UK continues as a full EU member until March 2019 with access to the single market and tariff free trade between the EU and UK. Different sectors of the UK economy will leave the single market and tariff free trade at different times during the two year transitional period.
- The UK and EU would attempt to negotiate, among other agreements, a bi-lateral trade agreement over that period.
- The UK would aim for a negotiated agreed withdrawal from the EU, although the UK could also exit without any such agreements in the event of a breakdown of negotiations.
- If the UK exits without an agreed deal with the EU, World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs could apply to trade between the UK and EU - but this is not certain.
- On full exit from the EU: the UK parliament would repeal the 1972 European Communities Act.
- The UK will then no longer participate in matters reserved for EU members, such as changes to the EU's budget, voting allocations and policies.

Rhan o gyngor dderbyniwyd gan / An extract from advice received from: Capita Asset Services

Specified and Non-Specified Investments

The Welsh Government 'Guidance on Local Government Investments' (Effective from 1 April 2010) provides the definition of specified and non-specified investments.

Paragraph 5.1 of the 'Guidance' states that an investment is specified if all of the following apply:-

(a) the investment is denominated in sterling and any payments or repayments in respect of the investment are payable only in sterling; and

(b) the investment is not a long-term investment (*); and

(c) the making of the investment is not defined as capital expenditure by virtue of regulation 20(1)(d) of the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (Wales) Regulations 2003 [SI 3239 as amended]; and

(ch) the investment is made with a body or in an investment scheme of high credit quality (**); or with one of the following public-sector bodies:

- **(i)** the United Kingdom Government
- **(ii)** a local authority in England or Wales (as defined in section 23 of the 2003 Act) or a similar body in Scotland or Northern Ireland
- **(iii)** a parish or community council.

The 'Guidance' also states that any investment not meeting the definition of paragraph 5.1 is classified as a non-specified investment.

During 2018/19 the Council does not intend to make any investments in foreign currencies, nor any with low credit quality bodies, nor any that are defined as capital expenditure by legislation (such as company shares). Non-specified investments will therefore be limited to (i) long-term investments; and (ii) deposits with the Council's own banker for transactional purposes if it fails to meet the basic credit criteria; in this instance balances will be minimised as far as is possible

The table in Appendix 6 set out the investment criteria and limits for the categories of investments intended for use during 2018/19 and therefore form the basis for the approved lending list.

Any proposed revisions or amendments during the year to the categories of specified and non-specified investments to be used and / or to the associated credit rating criteria / investment limits will be subject to prior approval by the County Council.

* *Section 2.4 of the 'Guidance' defines a long term investment as ''any investment other than (a) one which is due to be repaid within 12 months of the date on which the investment was made or (b) one which the local authority may require to be repaid within that period.''*

** *For the purposes of high credit quality the 'Guidance' states that ''for the purposes of paragraph 5.1(d), Welsh ministers recommend that the Strategy should define high credit quality (and where this definition refers to credit ratings, paragraph 6.1 (***) is relevant).'*

*** *Paragraph 6.1 of the 'Guidance' recommends that ''the Strategy should set out the authority's approach to assessing the risk of loss of investments, making clear in particular:*
- ***(a)*** *to what extent, if any, risk assessment is based upon credit ratings issued by one or more credit rating agencies;*
- ***(b)*** *where credit ratings are used, how frequently credit ratings are monitored and what action is to be taken when ratings change; and*
- ***(c)*** *what other sources of information on credit risk are used, additional to or instead of credit ratings.''*

The table in Appendix 6 of this strategy sets out what this Council defines as high credit quality and the associated investment criteria and limits and section 4.2 of this strategy sets out the Council's creditworthiness approach.

Counterparty Criteria

Category	Short Term Credit Rating (Fitch)	Short Term Credit Rating (Moody's)	Short Term Credit Rating (Standard & Poor's)	Long Term Credit Rating (Fitch)	Long Term Credit Rating (Moody's)	Long Term Credit Rating (Standard & Poor's)	Cash Limit	Time Limit
Bank and Building Societies (not nationalised or part nationalised)	**F1+**	**P-1**	**A-1+**	**AAA**	**Aaa**	**AAA**	**£10m**	**5 years**
	F1+	**P-1**	**A-1+**	**AA**	**Aa2**	**AA**	**£10m**	**3 years**
	F1+	**P-1**	**A-1+**	**AA-**	**Aa3**	**AA-**	**£10m**	**364 days**
	F1	**P-1**	**A-1**	**A**	**A2**	**A**	**£7.5m**	**6 months**
Nationalised / Part Nationalised UK Banks	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**£10m**	**364 days**
UK Central Government (irrespective of credit rating)	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**No maximum**	**No maximum**
UK Local Authorities**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**£5m**	**364 days**
Money Market Funds	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**AAA**	**AAA**	**AAA**	**£5m**	**6 months**

* *as defined in the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (Wales) Regulations 2003*

** *as defined in the Local Government Act 2003*

Notes and Clarifications

(1) Cash Limit

(i) The cash limits apply both to the individual counterparty and to the overall group to which it belongs (e.g. for the banks within the Lloyds Banking Group plc (being Bank of Scotland plc and Lloyds Bank plc), the investment limit applies to those banks individually and the banking group as a whole);

(ii) The overall cash limit for deposits over 364 days is £15m.

(2) Time Limit

(i) This up to and including the period indicated.

(3) Foreign Countries

(i) Investments in foreign countries will be limited to those that hold a sovereign credit rating of (Fitch) AA- or equivalent (from the agencies referred to in section 4.3 of this strategy) sovereign credit rating (based upon the lowest common denominator), and to a maximum of £10 million per foreign country.

(ii) Investments in countries whose lowest sovereign rating is not AA- or above will not be permitted. No country limit will apply to investments in the UK, irrespective of the sovereign credit rating.

(iii) Subsidiaries of foreign banking groups will normally be assessed according to the country of domicile of the parent organisation. However, Santander UK plc (a subsidiary of Spain's Banco Santander) will be classed as a UK bank due to its substantial UK franchises and the arms-length nature of the parent-subsidiary relationships.

(iv) Sovereign credit rating criteria and foreign country limits will not apply to investments in multilateral development banks (e.g. the European Investment Bank and the World Bank) or other supranational organisations (e.g. the European Union).

4. Credit Rating Downgrade

Should a credit rating downgrade place a counterparty below the minimum credit rating criteria for investment, the counterparty will cease to be used as soon as practicable.

If the S151 Officer wishes to continue investing with that counterparty approval will be sought from the Chair of the Audit Committee plus one other member of the Chair's choosing, who both must approve the action. This will then be reported as appropriate at the next available opportunity.

APPENDIX 7

Approved countries for investments [correct as at 24 October 2017]

This list is based on those countries which have sovereign ratings of AA- or higher (we show the lowest rating from Fitch, Moody's and S&P) and also, (except - at the time of writing - for Norway and Luxembourg), have banks operating in sterling markets which have credit ratings of green or above in the Capita Asset Services credit worthiness service.

AAA
- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+
- Finland
- Hong Kong
- U.S.A.

AA
- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- U.K.

AA-
- Belgium
- Qatar

Treasury management scheme of delegation

(i) County Council

- budget approval;
- approval of the annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement, Annual Investment Strategy and MRP Policy, annual Treasury Management Policy Statement and amendments thereto;
- approval of amendments to the Council's adopted clauses;
- receiving and reviewing monitoring reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities; and
- acting on recommendations received from the Audit Committee and/or Executive Committee.

(ii) Executive Committee

- budget consideration;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- approval of the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment;
- receiving and reviewing monitoring reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities and making recommendations to the County Council as appropriate; and
- acting on recommendations received from the Audit Committee.

(iii) Audit Committee

- Scrutiny of Treasury Management matters as required by CIPFA's Code of Practice on Treasury Management and the Council's Treasury Management Policy. This includes:-
  - scrutinising the annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement, Annual Investment Strategy, Annual MRP Policy, Annual Treasury Management Policy and Treasury Management Practices and making recommendations to the Executive Committee and County Council as appropriate;
  - scrutinising proposals for amendments to the annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement, Annual Investment Strategy, Annual MRP Policy, Annual Treasury Management Policy and Treasury Management Practices and to the adopted clauses and making recommendations to the Executive and County Council as appropriate;
  - receiving and scrutinising any other proposals relating to the treasury management which require a decision by the Executive or County Council; and
  - receiving and scrutinising monitoring reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities and make recommendations to the Executive and County Council as appropriate.

The Treasury Management role of the Section 151 Officer

The Section 151 (responsible) Officer's role includes:-

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers; and
- Responsibility for the execution and administration of its Treasury decisions, including decision on borrowing, investment and financing, have been delegated to the Section 151 Officer, who will act in accordance with the Council's policy statements and TMP's.

The CIPFA Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice

The key principles of CIPFA's ***Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice (2011 Edition)***, as described in Section 4 of that Code are as follows:-

Key Principle 1:
Public service organisations should put in place formal and comprehensive objectives, policies and practices, strategies and reporting arrangements for the effective management and control of their treasury management activities.

Key Principle 2:
Their policies and practices should make clear that the effective management and control of risks are prime objectives of their treasury management activities and that responsibility for these lies clearly within their organisations. Their appetite for risk should form part of their annual strategy, including any use of financial instruments for the prudent management of those risks, and should ensure that priority is given to security and liquidity when investing funds.

Key Principle 3:
They should acknowledge that the pursuit of value for money in treasury management and the use of suitable performance measures are valid and important tools for responsible organisations to employ in support of their business and service objectives; and that, within the context of effective risk management, their treasury management policies and practices should reflect this.

The Code then goes on to say that:

"In framing these recommendations, CIPFA acknowledges the difficulties of striving for effective risk management and control, whilst at the same time pursuing value for money. This code does not seek to be prescriptive about how this issue should be handled, particularly since it covers such a wide variety of organisations. However, where appropriate, the sector specific guidance notes give suitable advice. CIPFA recognises that no two organisations in the public services are likely to tackle this issue in precisely the same manner but success in this area of treasury management is likely to be viewed, especially in value for money terms, as an indicator of a strongly performing treasury management function."

"Even though it dates back to 1991, CIPFA considers that the report by the Treasury and Civil Service Committee of the House of Commons on the BCCI closure is still pertinent, wherein it was stated that:"

"In balancing risk against return, local authorities should be more concerned to avoid risks than to maximise returns."

"Indeed this view was supported by the Communities and Local Government Select Committee report into local authority investments in 2009."

"It is CIPFA's view that throughout the public services the priority is to protect capital rather than to maximise return. The avoidance of all risk is neither appropriate nor possible. However, a balance must be struck with a keen responsibility for public money."

Accordingly the Authority will adopt, as part of the standing orders, the following four clauses;

1. The Authority will create and maintain, as the cornerstones for effective treasury management:

- a treasury management policy statement, stating the policies, objectives and approach to risk management of its treasury management activities; and

- suitable treasury management practices (TMPs) setting out the manner in which the Authority will seek to achieve those policies and objectives, and prescribing how it will manage and control those activities.

The content of the Policy Statement and TMPs will follow the recommendations contained in Sections 6 and 7 of the Code, subject only to amendment where necessary to reflect the particular circumstances of the Authority. Such amendments will not result in the Authority materially deviating from the Code's key principles.

2. The County Council, Executive Committee and the Audit Committee will receive reports on the Authority's treasury management policies, practices and activities, including; an annual strategy and plan in advance of the year, a mid-year review report and an annual report after its close, in the form prescribed in the TMPs.

3. The County Council/Executive Committee are responsible for the implementation of the Authority's treasury management policies and practices in accordance with the Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation. The S151 Officer is responsible for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions, who will act in accordance with the Authority's policy statement and TMPs and, if he/she is a CIPFA member, CIPFA's Standard of Professional Practice on Treasury Management.

4. The Authority nominates Audit Committee to be responsible for ensuring effective scrutiny of treasury management strategy and policies.

Treasury Management Policy Statement

1. CIPFA defines its treasury management activities as: “The management of the authority’s investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks’’.

2. This organisation regards the successful identification, monitoring and control of risk to be the prime criteria by which the effectiveness of its treasury management activities will be measured. Accordingly, the analysis and reporting of treasury management activities will focus on their risk implications for the organisation, and any financial instruments entered into to manage these risks.

3. This organisation acknowledges that effective treasury management will provide support towards the achievement of its business and service objectives. It is therefore committed to the principles of achieving value for money in treasury management, and to employing suitable comprehensive performance measurement techniques, within the context of effective risk management.

PRUDENTIAL & TREASURY INDICATORS
BUDGET SETTING 2018/19

APPENDIX 11

No.	Indicator	2016/17 out-turn	2017/18 estimate	2018/19 proposal	2019/20 proposal	2020/21 proposal
Affordability						
1,2	Estimates of [or actual] ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream:					
	Council Fund	6.20%	6.25%	5.12%	5.47%	5.73%
	Housing Revenue Account (inclusive of settlement)	19.82%	23.02%	20.15%	15.88%	15.42%
	Total	7.68%	8.14%	6.86%	6.86%	7.10%
3	Estimates of incremental impact of capital investment decisions on the Council Tax			£0.00	£21.16	£56.31
	for the Band D Council Tax					
4 a	Estimates of incremental impact of capital investment decisions on housing rents			£48.74	£44.57	£45.53
	on average weekly rent levels					
4 b	Estimates of incremental impact of capital borrowing on housing rents for HRA			£0.00	£17.25	£16.02
	on average weekly rent levels					
Prudence						
5	Gross debt and the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Is the gross external debt < the CFR for the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for the current and the next two financial years?					
Capital Expenditure		**£000**	**£000**	**£000**	**£000**	**£000**
6,7	Estimates of [or actual] capital expenditure					
	Council Fund	28,030	22,030	38,810	34,350	16,060
	Housing Revenue Account	8,610	11,490	13,820	15,200	15,340
	Total	36,640	33,520	52,630	49,550	31,400
8,9	Estimates of [or actual] Capital Financing Requirement					
	Council Fund	91,510	96,410	108,120	121,880	132,950
	Housing Revenue Account	42,500	41,650	40,820	43,500	45,930
	Total	134,010	138,060	148,940	165,380	178,880
External Debt		**£000**	**£000**	**£000**	**£000**	**£000**
10	Authorised Limit					
	: General Borrowing	166,000	166,000	174,000	190,000	203,000
	: Other long term liabilities	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
	: Total	169,000	169,000	177,000	193,000	206,000

11	HRA Limit on Indebtedness;					
	HRA Limit on Indebtedness	58,533	58,533	58,533	58,533	58,533
	HRA CFR	42,500	41,650	40,820	43,500	45,930
	HRA headroom	16,033	16,883	17,713	15,033	12,603
12	Operational Boundary					
	: General Borrowing	161,000	161,000	169,000	188,000	201,000
	: Other long term liabilities	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
	: Total	164,000	164,000	172,000	191,000	204,000
13	Actual External Debt	117,110				
Treasury Management		**2016/17 out-turn**	**2017/18 estimate**	**2018/19 proposal**	**2019/20 proposal**	**2020/21 proposal**
14	The Local Authority has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice for Treasury Management in the Public Services	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		£000	**£000**	**£000**	**£000**	**£000**
15	Gross and net debt	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	The upper limit on the net debt as a proportion of gross debt					
16	The upper limit on fixed rate exposures:	143,000	166,000	167,000	169,000	171,000
	(net principal outstanding)					
17	The upper limit on variable rate exposures:	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000
	(net principal outstanding)					
18	The limit for total principal sums invested for periods longer than 364 days	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000
	(any long term investments carried forward from previous years will be included in each year's limit)					
			2017/18 upper limit		**2017/18 lower limit**	
19	The upper and lower limits for the maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing					
	• under 12 months		20%		0%	
	• 12 months and within 24 months		20%		0%	
	• 24 months and within 5 years		50%		0%	
	• 5 years and within 10 years		75%		0%	
	• 10 years and above		100%		0%	
			no change		no change	

APPENDIX 12

Glossary of and information on Prudential & Treasury Management indicators (References as per appendix 11)

Glossary

CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
Capital expenditure is expenditure on the purchase of a non-current asset, which will be used in providing services beyond the current financial year, or expenditure which adds to, and not merely maintains, the value of an existing non-current asset. Examples include: the building of a new school, the purchase of IT equipment, a major refurbishment of a care home.

CAPITAL FINANCING
Funds that are available to pay for capital expenditure. There are various methods of financing capital expenditure including borrowing, leasing, direct revenue financing, usable capital receipts, capital grants, capital contributions, revenue reserves and earmarked reserves.

CAPITAL FINANCING REQUIREMENT
The total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need.

CAPITAL PROGRAMME
The capital schemes the Council intends to carry out over a specific period of time.

CAPITAL RECEIPTS
Capital receipts represent the proceeds from the disposal of land or other non-current assets. Proportions of capital receipts can be used to finance new capital expenditure, within rules set down by the government, but they cannot be used to finance revenue expenditure.

CIPFA
This is The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, the lead professional and regulatory body for local Authority accounting.

HOUSING REVENUE ACCOUNT (HRA)
The HRA is a separate account to the Council Fund, and includes the income and expenditure arising from the provision of housing accommodation by the Council.

INTEREST RECEIVABLE OR PAYABLE
The effective interest rate method is used to measure the carrying value of a financial asset or liability measured at cost less accumulated amortisation, and to allocate associated interest income or expense to the relevant period. The effective interest rate is the rate that exactly discounts estimated future cash payments or receipts through the expected life of the financial instrument to equal the amount at initial recognition. The effective interest is adjusted to the actual interest payment or receipt through the Movement in Reserves Statement to ensure only actual interest is charged to Council Tax. For financial assets and liabilities carried at cost because the effective rate of interest is the same as the carrying rate of interest, the carrying value is adjusted for accrued interest.

MINIMUM REVENUE PROVISION (MRP)
The minimum amount which must be charged to the revenue account each year in order to provide for the repayment of loans and other amounts borrowed by the Council.

NET DEBT
The Net Debt is the Council's borrowings less cash and liquid resources.

PUBLIC WORKS LOANS BOARD (PWLB)
A Central Government Agency which provides loans for one year and/or more to authorities at interest rates only slightly higher than those at which the government can borrow itself.

REVENUE EXPENDITURE FUNDED BY CAPITAL UNDER STATUTE (REFCUS)
Expenditure which can be properly deferred (i.e. treated as capital in nature), but which does not result in, or remain matched with, a tangible asset. Examples of deferred charges are grants of a capital nature to voluntary organisations.

REVENUE SUPPORT GRANT
A grant paid by Central Government to authorities, contributing towards the general cost of their services.

SUPPORTED BORROWING
The Council borrows money to fund part of its capital programme. This borrowing is recognised by Central Government in its calculation of formula funding for the Council.

TEMPORARY BORROWING
Money borrowed for a period of less than one year.

UNSUPPORTED BORROWING
The Council can borrow additional money to the borrowing supported by Government to finance its capital expenditure as long as it is affordable and sustainable. This power is governed by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Prudential Code, with which the Council fully complies.

Information on Prudential & Treasury Management indicators

A) Affordability

1,2 Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

3. Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on council tax

This indicator identifies the revenue costs associated with proposed changes to the three year capital programme recommended in this budget report compared to the Council's existing approved commitments and current plans. The assumptions are based on the budget, but will invariably include some estimates, such as the level of Government support, which are not published over a three year period.

4(a) Estimates of the incremental impact of capital investment decisions on housing rent levels

Similar to the council tax calculation, this indicator identifies the trend in the cost of proposed changes in the housing capital programme recommended in this budget report compared to the Council's existing commitments and current plans, expressed as a discrete impact on weekly rent levels.

This indicator shows the revenue impact on any newly proposed changes, although any discrete impact will be constrained by rent controls.

4(b) Estimates of incremental impact of capital borrowing on housing rents for HRA .

This indicator shows the additional cost of borrowing for HRA on rent amount.

B) Prudence

5. Gross Debt and the CFR

The Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2018/19 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue purposes.

C) Capital expenditure

6,7. Estimates of Capital Expenditure

This is the forecast Capital Expenditure from 2017/18 to 2020/21, and is based on the Capital Programme for 2017/18 and the Capital Strategy for 2018/19.

8,9 The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

Another prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the borrowing need in line with each assets life, and so charges the economic consumption of capital assets as they are used.

The CFR includes any other long term liabilities (e.g. PFI schemes, finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. The Council currently has £nil of such schemes within the CFR.

CH) External Debt

10. The authorised limit for external debt. A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.

The S151 Officer reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in the budget report.

11. HRA Limit on Indebtedness. As part of the HRA self-financing reform each Welsh local authority with responsibility for housing will be allocated a limit on indebtedness in relation to the HRA; this essentially places a limit on the HRA CFR (to be applied at 31st March each year). The gap between the two, if the CFR is within the limit, will be referred to as the borrowing headroom. The forecast account for the HRA settlement on the same basis as for the ratio in reference 2.

12. The operational boundary. This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt and the ability to fund under-borrowing by other cash resources.

Treasury Management Indicators

Treasury management limits on activity

There are three debt related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these are to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs / improve performance. The indicators are:-

- Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies a maximum limit for variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments;
- Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates; and
- Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.